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Abstract
We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of study time choices of stu-
dents on a social network. We examine how network structure interacts with
student characteristics to affect academic achievement. Due to data limita-
tions, few papers examine the mechanisms through which peer effects operate.
The model is designed to exploit unique data collected in the Berea Panel
Study. Study time data allow us to quantify an intuitive mechanism for social
interactions: the cost of own study time may depend on friend study time.
Social network data allow study time choices and resulting academic achieve-
ment to be embedded in an equilibrium framework. We find friend study time
strongly affects own study time, and, therefore, student achievement. Not tak-
ing into account equilibrium behavior would drastically understate the effect
of peers. Sorting on friend characteristics appears important in explaining
variation across students in study time and achievement, and determines the
aggregate achievement level.
Keywords: social networks, peer effects, homophily, time-use
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1 Introduction
Peer effects are widely believed to be important for determining academic achieve-
ment. Most of the existing research in this context has focused on establishing a
causal link between peer characteristics and academic outcomes in an effort to pro-
vide evidence about whether peers matter.1 However, though crucial for policymak-
ing, empirical evidence on specific mechanisms generating peer effects is very limited.
In this paper we exploit unique data on college students from the Berea Panel Study
(BPS) to provide some of the first evidence about how peer effects are generated in an
academic setting. We consider the intuitively appealing mechanism that a student’s
study effort is influenced by her peers. We focus on what is likely the most relevant
set of peers in our higher education context, a student’s friends.2
The goal of this paper is to move beyond a demonstration that peer effects exist
and pursue some of the next steps necessary to understand how they are generated.
One step is to provide evidence about a mechanism underlying peer influences in
our context. This is in the spirit of Manski (2000), who stresses that, in order to
understand correlations between own and peer outcomes, it is important to clearly
define mechanisms and to directly measure them. Motivated by recent research which
has hypothesized that student effort is likely to be an input that is readily influenced
by peers in the short run (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006), Calvo´-Armengol
et al. (2009), Fruehwirth (2013), and De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2014)), we focus on
study time as an explicit mechanism through which peer effects could arise in the
first year of college.3
1See Epple and Romano (2011) for a survey of this extensive literature.
2Often due to data limitations, peer definitions are commonly taken to be all other students within
an observable administrative unit like a classroom, dormitory, or platoon. These units are inherently
of interest when the key policy question regards an administrative choice regarding their composition,
for example, classroom tracking or platoon assignment(Gamoran and Hallinan (1995), Hanushek
and Woessmann (2006), Carrell et al. (2009), Fu and Mehta (2014)). However, recent research
has recognized that, in many contexts, the relevant social network of peers is not well-represented
as disjoint, complete (e.g., students within a classroom interact with all other students in that
classroom, and no students outside that classroom) networks corresponding to administrative groups.
Rather, individuals are better modeled as interacting with each other in a (typically sparse) social
network that is not revealed directly from administrative groupings (Brock and Durlauf (2001a),
Brock and Durlauf (2001b), Conley and Udry (2001), Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009), Weinberg
(2009), Conley and Udry (2010), Weinberg (2013), Carrell et al. (2013)). From the standpoint
of establishing whether peers matter, it is less than ideal that the peer group under study is often
dictated by issues related to data availability rather than by a researcher’s priors about which type
of peers are likely to be most important.
3For a non-education (financial) example of research which is interested in understanding why
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Another step forward involves investigating the role social networks play in the
propagation of peer effects. General equilibrium effects may be key. Not only might
student i’s study time be influenced by i’s peers, but i’s peers’ study time may be in-
fluenced by i. Moreover, these types of feedback effects could work indirectly through
students in the social network who are not directly connected to student i. In gen-
eral, the distribution of feedback effects depends on three interrelated components.
First, the graph describing links in a social network, which we refer to as the “network
structure,” may be important in and of itself (Jackson and Yariv (2011)). Second, stu-
dents with different characteristics may differ in how much they are affected by their
peers.4 Third, students may form links based on these characteristics; in particular,
students may link to others with similar characteristics, i.e., the network may exhibit
“homophily.” Put together, the network structure and the specific manner in which
heterogeneous students are arranged on the network may determine how changes in
behavior propagate throughout the network and affect equilibrium outcomes.5
To take these important next steps, we move away from black box regressions in
which individuals’ outcomes are related to the characteristics or outcomes of peers
and estimate an equilibrium model of study time choice and resulting grade determi-
nation conditional on a social network. Estimating such a model entails substantial
data challenges. First, including an explicit mechanism requires student-level data
measuring an important input in the production of human capital through which peer
effects can be transmitted. Study time is a natural candidate, but, because collecting
reliable time-use information is very difficult in annual surveys, available data sources
typically do not contain information of this type.6 Second, equilibrium outcomes de-
peer effects exist, see Bursztyn et al. (2014). Richards-Shubik (2014) separates supply and demand
mechanisms in a model of sexual initiation.
4Sacerdote (2011) discusses, for example, heterogeneity in the effect of mean peer ability in
determining one’s own academic achievement.
5There is a literature on spatial autoregressive models which posits econometric models relating
one’s own outcomes to the outcomes and characteristics of one’s peers, and then solves for equilibrium
outcomes. See Pinkse et al. (2002) and Lee (2004), for example.
6Typically, the object of interest will be how much a respondent studies over an entire academic
period (semester or year). Measurement error will be present in answers to retrospective questions
which attempt to elicit study amounts over the entire period. An alternative is to elicit information
over a shorter, recent period using a time diary. However, the amount a person studied in the shorter
period will be a noisy measure of how much the person studied over the entire academic period.
The difficulty of finding current surveys that provide information about study time can be seen in
the work of Babcock and Marks (2011), whose goal is to detail changes in the amount of time spent
studying over the last several decades.
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pend on the entire social network, necessitating data characterizing the full set of peer
connections as well as data on characteristics that likely determine study time choices.
Among existing sources of social network data, perhaps only one, the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add-Health), could potentially provide a full
view of an entire social network in an educational setting where academic outcomes
and student characteristics are also observed. Unfortunately, because the Add-Health
dataset has a central focus on adolescent health and risk-related behaviors, it does not
contain information about time spent studying. Thus, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no existing a data source that is able to both characterize an entire social
network of students and provide direct evidence about a central input in the grade
production function that likely plays an important role in peer transmission.7
Our project is made possible by unique data from the Berea Panel Study (BPS)
that were collected specifically to overcome these current data limitations. To char-
acterize the entire social network, the BPS design involves surveying full cohorts of
students. The BPS is also unique in its high frequency of contact with students,
allowing, in each year, the collection of eight time-use diaries and the multiple mea-
sures of friendships which we use to define peers. We combine these survey data with
administrative data that include pre-college characteristics and college grades.
We develop our model to exploit these unique data. The model consists of two time
periods. The social network is known in the beginning of each period. Subsequently,
all students in the social network simultaneously choose their study time to maximize
human capital, net the cost of studying. A student’s cost of studying depends on
her own study time and friend study time, e.g., it may be more fun to study if your
friends are studying, or the opportunity cost of studying may be higher if your friends
are out having fun. Cost functions are allowed to be heterogeneous across students.
How much human capital is produced depends on a student’s own study time and
may also be heterogeneous across students, conditional on own study time. Social
interactions are generated because students take into account that friend study time
may affect one’s own cost of studying.
In the present work, we take the network as given. The tractability gained by this
approach allows us to make significant progress on the question of how students affect
7Sacerdote (2011) discusses several papers studying how peer ability may affect one’s own achieve-
ment. However, these papers typically do not examine explicit mechanisms through which peer
ability may be transmitted. See De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2014) and Tincani (2014) for exceptions.
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each other, given the entire social network. We show there exists a unique equilibrium
in the period study-time game for any social network. There is a growing literature
studying peer effects that has focused on modeling the formation of social networks, an
important and notoriously difficult problem (see Christakis et al. (2010), Mele (2013),
Badev (2013), de Paula et al. (2014), Hsieh and Lee (2015), or Sheng (2014)). Because
we do not model how friendships are formed, we limit our counterfactual exercises to
examine fully-specified networks of interest. Though our approach takes the network
as given, its virtue is that for reasonable parameter values it can accommodate any
combination of network structure and student characteristics – no matter the network
size or how complicated the nature of interconnectedness is within the network.
The tractability of our approach also allows us to provide some of the first em-
pirical evidence about how homophily, the tendency for individuals to have links to
others with similar characteristics, impacts outcomes. As Golub and Jackson (2012)
note, despite a large amount of work documenting the existence of homophily and
a smaller literature examining its origins, the literature modeling the effect of ho-
mophily is in its infancy.8 Golub and Jackson (2012) examine how homophily affects
convergence of agents’ beliefs in a social learning model where beliefs are updated
based upon information from neighbors.9 In their model, results are driven by the
link patterns that arise when an agent is more likely to have links with others in her
own group (who have similar information sets) than with agents belonging to differ-
ent groups. Our model’s implications are also shaped by such patterns of network
connections. In addition, our model allows students with differing characteristics to
have heterogeneous best responses, or “reactiveness,” to friend study time choices.
The previous studies most related to ours are perhaps those of Fruehwirth (2013),
Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009), De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2014), and Tincani (2014),
who stress the importance of equilibrium models of students’ effort choices but lack
our direct data on student effort. Fruehwirth (2013) and Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009)
estimate parameters of their respective models, effectively identifying effort through
residual variation in peer outcomes. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2014) and Tincani
8Jackson (2008) provides a discussion of work documenting the existence of homophily; see Ca-
margo et al. (2010) for a specific example. For theoretical models of homophily’s origins see Currarini
et al. (2009), Currarini et al. (2010), and Bramoulle´ et al. (2012). Badev (2013) allows for homophily
in his empirical study of friendship formation and smoking behavior.
9Acemoglu et al. (2011) develop a theoretical model of social learning to study how network
structure affects whether or not agents eventually learn the true state of the world.
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(2014) test the implications of different theoretical models of social interactions using
student achievement data.
Our objectives are to provide some of the first evidence about the mechanisms
underlying peer effects and the role social interactions play in the determination of
academic achievement. As such, we do not develop a novel approach to address the
difficult endogeneity problems that have been the focus of much previous work.10
However, the luxury of designing a survey specifically for the purposes of this paper
allows us to collect data to mitigate the most salient endogeneity concerns. In a
context where own and friend study time move together, our use of data on study time,
typically an unobserved input, can help explain the co-movement between own and
friend GPA. Although this may address endogeneity concerns about the determination
of GPA, one may also be concerned about how the relationship between own and friend
study time arises. Friendships may arise in part due to unobserved propensities to
study. At the time of college entrance, we collect and utilize previously unavailable
information about how much a student expects to study in college as well as how
much she actually studied in high school. These variables detailing one’s propensity
to study have substantial content; both expected college study time and high school
study time have strong correlations with study time in college. One prominent concern
in this vein is that the relationship between own and friend study time is caused by
preferences over course specialization. Although measures such as expected study
time would likely inform us about these preferences, we collected transcript data to
directly examine this concern. We also investigate additional channels wherein friend
characteristics or friend study time, which may be determinants of friend human
capital, directly affect one’s own production of human capital. We find no evidence
of such spillovers.
Our estimates provide strong evidence that friend study time has a substantial
effect on one’s own study time, which in turn is an important determinant of one’s
own achievement. We also find significant heterogeneity in reactiveness. That is, we
estimate students to have different best response functions, i.e., they react differently
10Documenting the existence of peer effects requires addressing the well-known omitted variables
(endogeneity) problem (or Manski (1993)’s “correlated unobservables”) that will be present if peer
groups are determined, in part, on the basis of unobservable student characteristics that also influence
academic performance. To deal with this issue, researchers have often looked for situations where
some subset of one’s peers (e.g., one’s college roommates (e.g., Sacerdote (2001)) are randomly
assigned.
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to changes in friend study time. This heterogeneity has equilibrium implications: we
estimate that a student in the 75th percentile propensity to study who is paired with
a student in the 75th percentile would study almost twice as much as a student in
the 25th percentile who is paired with a student in the 25th percentile.
To characterize the importance of social interactions it is necessary to go beyond
reporting our estimates of best response functions, to take into account the actual
social network.11 Therefore, we use our estimated model to further understand the
importance of peers using two counterfactual exercises. First, we examine how the
network structure, combined with homophilous sorting into friendships, affects the
response to changes in friend study time. We exogenously increase (shock) the study
time of each student and measure how study times and achievement change for other
students in the social network. There is substantial heterogeneity in study time re-
sponses depending on which student is shocked, with larger impacts associated with
more central students and students connected to more reactive peers. The specific
manner in which students with different characteristics are arranged on the network
is important for responses. The shock has a big impact when the shocked student
is directly connected to multiple reactive students, who then propagate the shock to
their friends. However, the shock has a small impact when it is initially only passed
through a less reactive student, who dampens it before passing it to the rest of the
network. This exercise also provides a natural framework for quantifying the impor-
tance of general equilibrium effects. On average, general equilibrium responses, which
take into account all feedback effects, produce a network-wide aggregate response that
is 2.7 times larger than the partial equilibrium counterpart, which only measures the
effect of the shock on immediate neighbors. This implies that peer effects may be
much easier to detect when general equilibrium interactions are taken into account.
Second, because peer effects are a function not only of reactiveness but also who is
friends with whom, we examine how achievement would differ if friend characteristics
were identically distributed across students instead of being strongly correlated with
one’s own characteristics, or homophilous, as in the data. This exercise provides a
natural comparison point from which we can assess the importance of homophily
in friendships. On average, women, blacks, and students with higher than median
high school GPAs have high propensities to study and tend, in the data, to sort into
11Kline and Tamer (2011) discuss the importance of distinguishing between estimates of techno-
logical parameters and the equilibrium effects of social interactions.
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friendships with students similar to themselves. Therefore, these groups tend to see
declines in their friends’ propensities to study in the counterfactual.12 This reduces
the average of own study times for these groups by 0.20, 0.25, and 0.15 hours per day,
respectively, corresponding to average reductions in achievement of about 0.05, 0.07,
and 0.04 GPA points, respectively. Moreover, due to the estimated heterogeneity in
best response functions and the lack of assortative matching in the counterfactual
networks, these groups’ losses are not offset by gains of their complements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a descrip-
tion of the BPS data. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 presents our empirical
specification. Section 5 discusses our results and counterfactual exercises, and Section
6 concludes.
2 Data
The BPS is a longitudinal survey that was designed to provide detailed information
about students’ input choices and educational outcomes in college, and labor market
outcomes in the early post-college period.13 The BPS survey design involved col-
lecting information about all students who entered Berea College, located in central
Kentucky, in the fall of 2000 and the fall of 2001. Baseline surveys were conducted
immediately before the start of first year classes and students were subsequently sur-
veyed 10-12 times each year during school. As has been discussed in previous work
that uses the BPS (e.g., Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006), Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2013)), caution is appropriate when considering exactly how results
from this case study would generalize to other specific institutions.
At the same time, from an academic standpoint, Berea has much in common with
many four-year colleges. It operates under a standard liberal arts curriculum and
the students at Berea are similar in academic quality to, for example, students at
the University of Kentucky (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008)). In addition,
earlier work found that academic decisions at Berea look very similar to decisions
made elsewhere. For example, dropout rates are similar to those found elsewhere (for
students from similar income backgrounds) and patterns of major-switching at Berea
are similar in spirit to those found by Arcidiacono (2004) in a dataset representative
12See Hoxby (2000) for other evidence regarding the effects of having female peers.
13The BPS was designed and administered by Todd Stinebrickner and Ralph Stinebrickner.
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of four-year college students. It is also worth noting that, not only does our focus on
one school make it feasible to collect the multiple surveys each year that provide data
more detailed in important dimensions than other existing surveys, but it also makes
outcomes such as college grade performance more comparable across students.
Our study is made possible by three types of information that are available in the
BPS. First, the BPS elicited each student’s closest friends, four times each year. Our
analysis utilizes friendship observations from the end of the first semester and the
end of the second semester. The survey question for the end of the first semester is
shown in Appendix A.1, and, while not shown, the survey question for the end of the
second semester is similar. One motivation for using end-of-semester observations is
that these survey questions have a full-semester flavor to them; they asked students to
list the four people who had been their best friends that semester. Second, the BPS
collected detailed time-use information eight times each year, using the twenty-four
hour time diary shown in Appendix A.1. Finally, questions on the baseline survey
reveal the number of hours that a student studied per week in high school and how
much the student expects to study per week in college. The survey data are merged
with detailed administrative data on race, sex, high school grade point average, college
entrance exam scores, and college GPA in each semester.
This paper focuses on the freshman year for students in the 2001 entering cohort.
We focus on students in this cohort because the survey contains more comprehensive
friendship and time-use information for them. We focus on understanding grade
outcomes during students’ freshmen years for two primary reasons. First, as discussed
more in Section 5.1, students tend to have similar course loads in their first year under
the general liberal arts curriculum at Berea. Second, we are able to characterize the
network most completely in the first year both because survey response rates are
very high in the first year and because over 80% of friends reported by students in
their freshman year are themselves freshmen.14 These advantages tend to fade in
subsequent years as friendships change (in part due to substantial dropout after the
first year) and students’ programs of study specialize.
14Approximately 88% of all entering students in the 2001 cohort completed our baseline survey,
and response rates remained high for the eleven subsequent surveys that were administered during
the freshman year.
9
2.1 Descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of 307 students who are each observed in the two semesters of
their freshman year. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of student characteristics.
The first row in each of the six panels shows an overall sample average for the variable
of interest described in the first column. Forty-four percent of students are male,
18% of students are black, the mean high school grade point average for the sample
is 3.39, the mean combined score on the American College Test (ACT) is 23.26,
and, on average, students studied 11.24 hours per week in high school and expect
to study 24.96 hours per week in college. The subsequent rows in each panel show
sample averages of the variable of interest in the first column for different groups. For
example, the third panel shows that, on average, males have lower high school grade
point averages than females (3.24 vs. 3.51) and blacks have lower high school grade
point averages than nonblacks (3.14 vs. 3.45). The fifth panel shows that blacks
studied more, on average, in high school than other students (15.29 vs. 10.36).15
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of outcomes during the first year. The first
rows of panels 1 and 2, respectively, show that, on average, students study 3.45 hours
in the first semester and 3.48 hours in the second semester. The subsequent rows
of the first two panels show that, on average, males study less than females, blacks
study more than nonblacks, and students with above-median high school GPAs study
more than students with below-median high school GPAs.16 The first rows of panels 3
and 4, respectively, show that the average first semester GPA is 2.89 and the average
second semester GPA is 2.93. The subsequent rows of the third and fourth panels
show that males, blacks, and students with below-median high school GPAs all have
lower average GPAs than their counterparts.17
Our main results define friendship as the union of reported links between two
students that semester.18 Table 3 summarizes friend data for those who have at
least one friend in each semester, stratified by the same characteristics as in Table
1. The top panel shows that students have 3.3 friends on average. The mean masks
15The first two differences in means are significantly different at the 0.001 level. The averages of
high school study time for blacks and nonblacks are significantly different at the 0.01 level.
16Pooling observations from both semesters, the first and last differences in means are significantly
different at a 0.05 level and, given the relatively small number of black students, the middle difference
in means is significant at a 0.10 level.
17Pooling observations from both semesters, all of these differences are significant at a 0.05 level.
18Two students are defined to be friends if either reports being friends with the other. We inves-
tigate alternative definitions of friendship in Appendix A.4.
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considerable variation: the minimum number of friends is one, while the maximum
is 10 friends. The second and third panels show that male and black students (and,
therefore, female and nonblack students) sort strongly towards students with the same
characteristics. For example, 74% of the friends of males are male, while only 18% of
the friends of females are male. Similarly, 69% of the friends of blacks are black, while
only 7% of the friends of nonblack students are black. In addition, the third panel
shows that students with above-median high school GPAs have fewer black friends.
The fourth and fifth panels show that male and black students have friends with lower
incoming GPAs and lower combined ACT scores. The sixth and seventh panels show
that males have friends who studied less in high school and expect to study less in
college (compared to females), while blacks have friends who studied more in high
school and expect to study more in college (compared to nonblacks).
The last panel of Table 3 describes friend study time. Consistent with own study
time in Table 2, the first row shows that, on average, friend study time is 3.5 hours
per day. The second and third rows of the last panel show that average friend study
time is much lower for males than for females (3.16 vs. 3.76 hours per day).
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Table 1: Own summary statistics
Variable Group N Mean SD Min q1 q2 q3 Max
(1) Male indicator all 307 0.44 0.5 0 0 0 1 1
given black 55 0.45 0.5 0 0 0 1 1
given nonblack 252 0.43 0.5 0 0 0 1 1
given above-med. HS GPA 155 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
given below-med. HS GPA 152 0.55 0.5 0 0 1 1 1
(2) Black indicator all 307 0.18 0.38 0 0 0 0 1
given male 134 0.19 0.39 0 0 0 0 1
given female 173 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1
given above-med. HS GPA 155 0.1 0.31 0 0 0 0 1
given below-med. HS GPA 152 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1
(3) HS GPA all 307 3.39 0.47 1.68 3.09 3.5 3.8 4
given male 134 3.24 0.51 1.68 2.9 3.21 3.7 4
given female 173 3.51 0.4 2.13 3.3 3.6 3.85 4
given black 55 3.14 0.46 2.24 2.78 3.1 3.52 4
given nonblack 252 3.45 0.46 1.68 3.19 3.53 3.8 4
given above-med. HS GPA 155 3.77 0.17 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 4
given below-med. HS GPA 152 3 0.35 1.68 2.8 3.08 3.29 3.47
(4) ACT all 307 23.26 3.61 14 21 23 26 33
given male 134 22.54 3.77 14 20 23 25 31
given female 173 23.82 3.39 17 21 24 26 33
given black 55 19.91 2.51 14 18 20 21 25
given nonblack 252 23.99 3.4 14 22 24 26 33
given above-med. HS GPA 155 24.45 3.53 17 22 25 27 33
given below-med. HS GPA 152 22.04 3.28 14 20 22 24 31
(5) HS study* all 307 11.24 11.35 0 4 8 15 70
given male 134 11.43 11.94 0 3.12 8 15 70
given female 173 11.1 10.9 0 4 9 15 70
given black 55 15.29 14 0 5 10.5 20 70
given nonblack 252 10.36 10.51 0 3 7 14 70
given above-med. HS GPA 155 10.66 10.44 0 4 8 14.5 70
given below-med. HS GPA 152 11.84 12.21 0 3.38 8.25 15 70
(6) Expected study** all 307 24.96 11.61 0 17 23 31 64
given male 134 22.72 11.08 0.97 16 20.75 27.38 64
given female 173 26.68 11.74 0 19 25.5 33 57.5
given black 55 28.56 13.56 0 19 25 38.5 57.5
given nonblack 252 24.17 11.01 0 17 22.5 30.62 64
given above-med. HS GPA 155 25.18 10.47 0 18 23.5 32 56
given below-med. HS GPA 152 24.72 12.69 0 16 22.25 30.12 64
* Hours per week spent studying during senior year of high school
** Expected study hours per week in college
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Table 2: Own summary statistics for outcomes, by semester
Variable Group N Mean SD Min q1 q2 q3 Max
(1) Sem. 1 Own study* all 296 3.45 1.67 0 2.33 3.29 4.5 10.33
given male 129 3.16 1.76 0 2 2.92 4.09 8.66
given female 167 3.67 1.56 0 2.62 3.38 4.62 10.33
given black 53 3.8 1.63 0 2.84 3.67 4.78 8.33
given nonblack 243 3.37 1.67 0 2.25 3.25 4.37 10.33
given above-med. HS GPA 153 3.6 1.7 0 2.41 3.34 4.75 8.58
given below-med. HS GPA a 143 3.28 1.61 0 2.25 3.22 4.04 10.33
(2) Sem. 2 Own study* all 278 3.48 1.6 0 2.23 3.34 4.75 9
given male 117 3.19 1.67 0 2 3 4.34 9
given female 161 3.68 1.52 0 2.58 3.41 4.79 7.75
given black 50 3.75 1.55 0 2.74 3.5 4.96 7.33
given nonblack 228 3.42 1.6 0 2.17 3.33 4.67 9
given above-med. HS GPA 145 3.69 1.47 0 2.66 3.67 4.83 7.92
given below-med. HS GPA 133 3.25 1.7 0 2 3.08 4.38 9
(3) Sem. 1 GPA all 307 2.89 0.78 0 2.49 3.06 3.46 4
given male 134 2.72 0.8 0.3 2.17 2.8 3.29 4
given female 173 3.02 0.74 0 2.66 3.13 3.55 4
given black 55 2.42 0.78 0 1.82 2.57 2.84 4
given nonblack 252 3 0.74 0.3 2.58 3.11 3.55 4
given above-med. HS GPA 155 3.19 0.62 0.52 2.81 3.29 3.69 4
given below-med. HS GPA 152 2.59 0.8 0 2 2.66 3.12 4
(4) Sem. 2 GPA all 301 2.93 0.78 0 2.53 3.05 3.46 4
given male 131 2.74 0.84 0 2.38 2.82 3.33 4
given female 170 3.07 0.71 0.44 2.66 3.2 3.54 4
given black 53 2.58 0.86 0.44 2.22 2.62 3.33 3.78
given nonblack 248 3 0.75 0 2.58 3.08 3.5 4
given above-med. HS GPA 155 3.21 0.66 0 2.82 3.36 3.74 4
given below-med. HS GPA 146 2.63 0.79 0.26 2.15 2.66 3.24 4
*Note: Average hours per day spent studying during the semester (from time diaries).
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Table 3: Average friend summary statistics, pooled over both semesters
Variable Group N Mean SD Min q1 q2 q3 Max
(1) Num. friends all 614 3.31 1.58 1 2 3 4 10
given male 268 3.22 1.59 1 2 3 4 10
given female 346 3.38 1.57 1 2 3 4 9
given black 110 3.21 1.35 1 2 3 4 7
given nonblack 504 3.33 1.62 1 2 3 4 10
given above-med. HS GPA 310 3.34 1.62 1 2 3 4 10
given below-med. HS GPA 304 3.28 1.53 1 2 3 4 8
(2) Frac. male friends all 614 0.43 0.39 0 0 0.33 0.75 1
given male 268 0.74 0.31 0 0.5 0.82 1 1
given not male 346 0.18 0.25 0 0 0 0.33 1
given black 110 0.43 0.4 0 0 0.33 0.83 1
given not black 504 0.42 0.39 0 0 0.33 0.75 1
given above-med. HS GPA 310 0.35 0.38 0 0 0.25 0.67 1
given below-med. HS GPA 304 0.5 0.39 0 0 0.5 1 1
(3) Frac. black friends all 614 0.18 0.32 0 0 0 0.25 1
given male 268 0.18 0.32 0 0 0 0.25 1
given not male 346 0.17 0.33 0 0 0 0.2 1
given black 110 0.69 0.38 0 0.43 1 1 1
given not black 504 0.07 0.16 0 0 0 0 1
given above-med. HS GPA 310 0.1 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
given below-med. HS GPA 304 0.26 0.39 0 0 0 0.45 1
(4) Friend HS GPA all 614 3.37 0.32 2.24 3.2 3.41 3.62 4
given male 268 3.29 0.33 2.25 3.07 3.34 3.53 4
given not male 346 3.44 0.29 2.24 3.29 3.46 3.64 4
given black 110 3.18 0.34 2.25 2.96 3.19 3.41 4
given not black 504 3.42 0.3 2.24 3.25 3.45 3.63 4
given above-med. HS GPA 310 3.46 0.27 2.65 3.29 3.46 3.63 4
given below-med. HS GPA 304 3.29 0.35 2.24 3.08 3.35 3.55 3.92
(5) Friend ACT all 614 23.29 2.63 16 21.67 23.33 25 32
given male 268 22.72 2.64 16.33 21 23 24.64 31
given not male 346 23.74 2.54 16 22 23.67 25.5 32
given black 110 21.2 2.53 16 19.33 21 22.5 29
given not black 504 23.75 2.43 16.33 22.25 23.67 25.33 32
given above-med. HS GPA 310 23.79 2.42 17.5 22.23 23.67 25.33 32
given below-med. HS GPA 304 22.78 2.74 16 21 23 25 30
(6) Friend HS study all 614 11.03 7.64 0 6 9.5 14.47 70
given male 268 10.53 7.37 0.5 5.17 9 14 37.33
given not male 346 11.41 7.83 0 6.5 9.79 14.6 70
given black 110 14.62 7.31 2.5 9.18 13.92 18.75 37
given not black 504 10.24 7.49 0 5.5 8.68 13.19 70
given above-med. HS GPA 310 11.48 8.44 0.5 6 9.7 14 70
given below-med. HS GPA 304 10.57 6.7 0 6 9.17 14.64 37.33
(7) Friend expected study all 614 24.82 7.4 0 19.75 23.55 29.62 55
given male 268 22.89 6.97 4.06 18.23 21.65 27.05 55
given not male 346 26.33 7.38 0 21.02 25.06 31.38 52
given black 110 28.05 8.53 12 21.35 28.9 33.79 51
given not black 504 24.12 6.94 0 19.5 23 28.2 55
given above-med. HS GPA 310 24.72 7.42 0 20 23.55 29.48 55
given below-med. HS GPA 304 24.93 7.39 10.5 19.31 23.61 29.81 52
(8) Friend study* all 614 3.5 1.72 0 2.47 3.26 4.28 11.93
given male 268 3.16 1.49 0.5 2.21 3 3.88 8.46
given not male 346 3.76 1.83 0 2.65 3.51 4.5 11.93
given black 110 3.78 1.77 0.5 2.7 3.52 4.47 10.81
given not black 504 3.44 1.7 0 2.4 3.2 4.24 11.93
given above-med. HS GPA 310 3.64 1.79 0 2.56 3.36 4.41 11.93
given below-med. HS GPA 304 3.36 1.64 0.5 2.36 3.17 4.13 10.81
*Note: Average hours per day friends spent studying during the semester (from friends’ time diaries).
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Table 4: Network characteristics
Friendship transitions
Prob. friendship reported first 0.51
semester but not second
i.e. Pr{A2(i, j) = 0|A1(i, j) = 1}
Prob. second semester 0.51
friendship is new
i.e. Pr{A1(i, j) = 0|A2(i, j) = 1}
Correlations between
own and avg. of friends
Black 0.74
Male 0.71
HS GPA 0.23
Combined ACT 0.31
HS study time 0.23
Expected study time 0.14
Table 4 shows other network characteristics. Both the probability that a first-
semester friendship no longer exists in the second semester and the probability that a
second-semester friendship was not present in the first semester are 0.51. Consistent
with the findings from Table 3, the correlations in right side of the table shows
substantial sorting on the basis of observable characteristics.
Table 5 presents descriptive OLS regression results predicting own study time (left
column) and GPA (right column), pooling observations in the two semesters.19 The
study time regression shows evidence of significant partial correlations of one’s own
study time (computed as the average amount the student reports studying in the
time diaries within a semester) with own sex, own high school GPA, and own high
school study time. Of particular relevance for our analysis, one’s own study time also
has a significant positive partial correlation with friend study time (computed as the
average over friends of their own study times). The GPA regression shows that own
achievement has a significant positive partial correlation with being female, nonblack,
and having above-median high school GPA. Own achievement also has a significant
partial correlation with own study time.20
3 Model
Students are indexed by i = 1, . . . , N and time periods (semesters) by t = 1, 2. We
denote the study time of student i in time period t as sit and let St define a column
vector collecting all students’ study times during that period. We treat the adjacency
19Standard errors are clustered at the student level.
20In Section 5.1 we discuss modifying the specification in column (2) of Table 5 to include friend
characteristics and friend study time. We find that own study time remains an important predictor
of own achievement.
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Table 5: Study time and GPA OLS regressions
Dependent variable:
Own study GPA
(1) (2)
Male −0.369∗∗ −0.131∗
(0.171) (0.076)
Black 0.116 −0.225∗∗
(0.214) (0.109)
HS GPA 0.413∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.081)
ACT −0.032 0.040∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.013)
HS study 0.043∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.008) (0.004)
Expected study −0.002 −0.006
(0.009) (0.003)
Friend study 0.166∗∗∗
(0.039)
Own study 0.090∗∗∗
(0.022)
Constant 1.915∗∗ 0.417
(0.759) (0.362)
Observations 574 571
R2 0.169 0.259
Clustered SE student student
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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matrix representing the network of friendships as pre-determined; we discuss the
implications of this assumption in Section 3.2. This matrix in period t, denoted At,
has a main diagonal of zeros and an (i, j) entry of one if student i has j as a friend
and zero otherwise.21 The average study time of i’s friends during period t is:
s−it =
∑N
j=1At(i, j)sjt∑N
j=1At(i, j)
. (1)
Taking into account their friends, students make decisions about how much to
study in a particular semester by considering the costs and benefits of studying. The
benefits of studying come from the accumulation of human capital. The production
function for human capital, y(·), is:
y(sit, µyi) =β1 + β2sit + µyi, (2)
where µyi is an observable “human capital type” which allows the amount a person
learns in school to vary across people, conditional on her own study level. As will
be discussed in Section 4, in practice this type will be constructed using observable
characteristics that have consistently been found to influence academic performance.
We adopt a value-added formulation for the evolution of human capital, i.e., the
human capital type is assumed to a sufficient statistic for the history of prior inputs.22
The cost of studying, c(·), is determined by:
c(sit, s−it, µsi) = θ1sit + θ2γ(µsi)sit +
θ3sit
sτs−it
+
θ4γ(µsi)sit
sτs−it
+
θ5s
2
it
2sτs−it
, (3)
where friend study time enters the cost function by reducing the cost of one’s own
studying, with curvature given by τs. It may be less arduous (or more fun) to study
21Other than its being full rank, we impose no restrictions on At. Though in our baseline empirical
specification we use the union of reported links (i.e. At(i, j) = 1 if either i reports being friends
with j, or vice versa), the model could also accommodate non-reciprocal links (i.e., i may link to j
without j linking to i).
22We assume the human capital type is constant between the periods. It is feasible to extend
our static framework to a dynamic one allowing the human capital type to evolve between periods.
However, the benefits of doing this are mitigated by two facts: (1) each model period corresponds
to a semester, which is shorter than the period typically considered when estimating value-added
production functions in an educational context (see Hanushek (1979) and Todd and Wolpin (2003) for
discussions of issues related to the estimation of education production functions), and (2) we study
students during their freshman year, before they typically specialize in terms of course material,
meaning second semester coursework does not build heavily on first semester coursework.
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at the library when everyone else is at the library. Conversely, if all your friends are
at the library, it may be less fun to stay in your dormitory room. The term µsi is
i’s propensity to study, or “study type,” which allows the disutility from studying
(or utility from leisure) to vary across students, conditional on own and friend study
levels. As will be discussed in Section 4, in practice this type will be constructed from
observable characteristics reflecting one’s propensity to study. Study types enter the
model through the γ(·), defined as:
γ(µsi) =
1
exp(τµ,1µsi + τµ,2µ2si)
, (4)
which allows the cost function to have intercepts and slopes that vary across people
of different study types. We refer to γ(µsi) as the “effective study type.” We do not
include a fixed cost of studying because almost no students report zero study time
over the semester.
With full knowledge of the At sequence and all students’ human capital types
{µyi}Ni=1 and study time types {µsi}Ni=1, students simultaneously choose study times
to maximize utility, which we assume to be separable across periods:23
u(si1, si2) =
{
2∑
t=1
y(sit, µyi)− c(sit, s−it, µsi)
}
. (5)
3.1 Model Solution
The student can solve each period’s problem separately because her decision problem
is additively separable across time periods t.24 Student i’s best response to friend
study time in t is given by:
sit = arg max
s
{y(s, µyi)− c(s, s−it, µsi)}. (6)
23As written, students choose a sequence of study times, knowing the sequence {A1, A2}. The
alternative assumption, where students know only the adjacency matrix that period when choosing
their study time and have to calculate expectations over the future, would have identical predictions
in our model. See Section 3.1.
24If utility were nonlinear in semester achievement or the argument of the cost function were
study time over the whole year, the problem would no longer be separable across time periods. We
assume student utility is linear in achievement because non-linearity of utility in achievement would
be difficult to separate from non-linearity in the cost function without functional form restrictions.
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Differentiating (6) with respect to own study time gives ∂y
∂s
= ∂c
∂s
, i.e., the utility-
maximizing study time equates the marginal return for increasing study time with
the marginal cost. Expanding the optimality condition gives:
β2 = θ1 + θ2γ(µsi) + θ3
1
sτs−it
+ θ4
γ(µsi)
sτs−it
+ θ5
sit
sτs−it
.
Solving for own study time yields the best response function, which expresses student
i’s study time as a function of friend study time:
sit = −θ3
θ5
− θ4
θ5
γ(µsi) +
(β2 − θ1)
θ5
sτs−it −
θ2
θ5
γ(µsi)s
τs
−it. (7)
Equation (3) shows that the term associated with θ5 introduces curvature into the
student’s cost function. Equation (7) shows that this curvature is necessary for an
interior equilibrium. If θ5 were zero, the student’s objective in Equation (6) would
be linear in own study time and there would not exist an interior best response to
friend study time. Equation (7) also shows that one of the preference parameters θ
must be normalized. Therefore, we fix θ5 equal to one, resulting in the final form of
the student best response function:
sit = −θ3 − θ4γ(µsi) + (β2 − θ1)sτs−it − θ2γ(µsi)sτs−it ≡ ψ(s−it, µsi). (8)
Note that best response functions depend on study type µsi; when notationally
convenient we suppress the study type and write the best response function as ψi(s−it).
Own study time is increasing linearly in the productivity of own study time β2,
and may also increase in own study type, µsi, depending on θ2 and θ4. We restrict
parameters to ensure that own study time is a weakly increasing and weakly concave
function of friend study time.
As shown in Section 3.1.1, concave best response functions ensure existence of a
unique equilibrium for the study time game.25 As shown in equations (7) and (8),
the separable form we adopted for the cost function has the benefit of producing a
closed-form solution for the student best response function. We show in Appendix
A.2 that concavity of the best response function would result from any cost function
possessing the natural properties of being strictly convex in sit and weakly concave
in s−it (i.e., τs ≤ 1).
25We compute the equilibrium by iterating best responses.
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Figure 1: Partial versus general equilibrium effects resulting from an exogenous in-
crease in sA
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3.1.1 Equilibrium
Definition 1 (Period Nash equilibrium). A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in study
times S∗ = [s∗1, s
∗
2, · · · , s∗N ]′ satisfies s∗i = ψ(s∗−i, µsi), for i ∈ N , given adjacency
matrix A.
Claim 1. Let k be the number of hours during the entire time period. There exists a
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium if ψi : R
N 7→ R are weakly concave and weakly
increasing, ψi(0) > 0, and ψi(k) < k for i ∈ N .
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Example 1. Consider a network of three friends (A,B,C), in which each student
is directly connected to the others, at an initial equilibrium S∗0 = (s
∗
A0, s
∗
B0, s
∗
C0). To
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consider the effect of an exogenous increase to the study time of student A on the
achievement of B, differentiate yB with respect to sA:
∂yB
∂sA
= β2
∂sB
∂s−B
∂s−B
∂sA
= β2
∂sB
∂s−B
∂( sA
2
+ sC
2
)
∂sA
= β2ψ
′
B(s−B)
(
1
2
+
ψ′C(s−C)
4
)
.
To calculate the partial equilibrium effect, we can use the estimated best response
and production functions to calculate how yB changes due to a change in sA, fixing
sC = s
∗
C0. However, if ψ
′
C(s−C) is positive, which we estimate to be the case, this
will understate the effect of increasing sA because sC will be higher in the new equi-
librium. Figure 1 demonstrates the difference between partial and general equilibrium
effects. First, consider the initial equilibrium characterized by the intersection of best
responses of B and C, given sA = s
∗
A0 (black dot). The increase in sA shifts ψB
vertically for every sC. The partial equilibrium effect on study time, represented by
the vertical distance between the black dot and the red square, takes into account only
this shift, ignoring the change in ψC. However, the change in sA also shifts ψC hori-
zontally. The general equilibrium effect, represented by the vertical distances between
the black dot and the blue triangle, also takes into account this shift in ψC and is
therefore larger.
3.2 Model discussion
There are two main implications of treating the adjacency matrix as pre-determined.
First, if students sort into friendships based on expected benefits, a model of the
friendship formation process could serve as the basis for a control function for unob-
servables affecting sorting (Chan (2015), Hsieh and Lee (2015), Badev (2013)). As
discussed in the introduction and Section 5.1, the fact that we designed a survey
specifically for this project allows us to take a direct approach by collecting data to
address this endogeneity problem, mitigating our need to model friendship formation
to derive such a control function. Second, because we do not model how friendships
are formed, we must limit our counterfactual exercises to examine fully-specified social
networks of interest.26
Our model allows for more variety in network interactions than typical approaches.
Part of this is due to the nonlinearity in the model when τs is different from one. How-
26There is a growing literature modeling friendship choices (Badev (2013), de Paula et al. (2014),
Mele (2013)), which typically abstracts from mechanisms underlying payoffs to friendship formation.
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ever, even with τs = 1, implying best response functions are linear in friend study
time, we have more flexibility than the most commonly used social interactions mod-
els because their linear-in-means structure restricts the impact of friend averages to
be common across students. In contrast, our framework allows a student’s best re-
sponse to s−it to be heterogeneous across students, depending on study type. This
heterogeneity interacts with the entire network graph represented in At and the dis-
tribution of study types across nodes to determine outcomes. The relevant sorting
of students across nodes is not a simple form of homophily, wherein friends tend to
have similar study types. Rather, it matters exactly how the different study types
are arranged on the network graph (i.e., one’s own study type, friends’ study types,
friends of friends’ study types, etc.).
4 Estimation
The model provides a mapping from the adjacency matrix At and all the students’
types {(µsi, µyi)}Ni=1 to a unique equilibrium in study times for all students, S∗t . The
equilibrium study times S∗t generate achievement in equilibrium y
∗
it via the produc-
tion function y(si, µyi). The model is operationalized by parameterizing a student’s
types as linear combinations of observable characteristics collected in a vector xi.
This vector includes indicators for being black and being male along with high school
GPA, combined ACT score, average hours per week of study time in high school, and
expected hours of study time per week in college. Thus, we take µsi = x
′
iωs and µyi =
x′iωy.
27 This allows us to express each student’s equilibrium study time and achieve-
ment as a function of At and all students’ characteristics, which we collect in a matrix
X. Given the full set of parameters Γ = (β1, β2, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, ωs, ωy, τµ,1, τµ,2, τs)
′, we
write these outcomes for individual i as
s∗it = ψ(s
∗
−it, µsi) = δs(At, X; Γ)
and
y∗it = y(s
∗
it, µyi) = δy(At, X; Γ),
where s∗−it is defined by applying equation (1) to St and At.
We estimate Γ by maximum likelihood, using data on achievement and study time.
27We set ωs,HS GPA = 1 to identify γ(·).
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Our measure of achievement is the student’s semester-level grade point average (GPA)
measured on a four-point scale, denoted y˜it. In our data there are approximately 7%
of students who have a GPA of four and 1% who have a GPA of zero. Therefore we
take a Tobit model approach to fitting GPA. We define latent GPA as y∗it + it where
it is a Gaussian measurement error, IID and independent from A and X. Thus our
Tobit model with censoring at zero and four becomes:
y˜it =

4 if y∗it + it ≥ 4
0 if y∗it + it ≤ 0
y∗it + it otherwise.
The GPA component of the likelihood function for individual i at time t is simply
the likelihood for this Tobit model, with censoring at zero and four:
Lyit = Φ
(
0− δy(At, X; Γ)
σ
)1{y˜it=0}
×
(
1− Φ
(
4− δy(At, X; Γ)
σ
))1{y˜it=4}
× 1
σ
φ
(
y˜it − δy(At, X; Γ)
σ
)
,
where Φ and φ denote the CDF and PDF, respectively, of the standard normal dis-
tribution.
The likelihood function also contains observations on study times. Our measures
of s∗it come from up to four within-semester reports of study time for each student in
semester t. Each study time observation is a report of time the student spent studying
in a 24-hour period. Study time report r for student i in semester t is denoted s˜rit.
We use Rit to denote the set of reports for student i in semester t. These study time
observations are assumed to be noisy measures of s∗it.
28 Approximately 5% of our
study time observations are zero, therefore we use a Tobit model approach analogous
to that for GPA. Defining latent study time as s∗it + ηrit, reported study time is:
s˜rit =
0 if s∗it + ηrit ≤ 0s∗it + ηrit otherwise
The contribution for student i, report r in semester t is:
Lsrit = Φ
(
0− δs(At, X; Γ)
ση
)1{s˜rit=0}
× 1
ση
φ
(
s˜rit − δs(At, X; Γ)
ση
)
.
28Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2004) document how reported study time varies within
semesters.
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We treat the  and η measurement errors as jointly independent across students,
semesters, and study time reports. The likelihood contribution for student i is there-
fore:
Li =
(∏
t
∏
r∈Rit
Lsrit
)
×
(∏
t
Lyit
)
.
We note that our method of fitting the model to data is close to the approach of
fitting δs(At, X; Γ) and δy(At, X; Γ) to observed study time and GPA, respectively,
via least squares. We obtain qualitatively very similar results using least squares but
prefer treatment, in particular, of observations with GPA=4 as a censored measure
of achievement.
5 Estimation Results
Table 6 contains parameter estimates. The top panel contains the parameters that
enter the human capital production function. The key parameter is the marginal
product of own study time on achievement, β2. The point estimate of 0.254 implies
that increasing own study time by one hour per day increases achievement by about a
quarter of a GPA point, ceteris paribus. Table 6 shows that students with high GPAs
in high school and high ACT scores accumulate significantly more human capital,
and black students accumulate significantly less human capital.
As can be seen in equation (8), the curvature in the best response function is
given by τs, the exponent on s−it. We estimated the model allowing τs to be in the
set [0,1], nesting the standard assumption of a linear best response function (i.e., that
τs=1).
29 However, because our estimation provided evidence that τs in equation (9)
is indistinguishable from one, we re-estimated the model with τs=1.
30 Estimates of
the parameters in the study cost function appear in the second panel of Table 6. It is
perhaps easiest to interpret the study cost function parameters by substituting them
into the best response function:
ψ̂(s−it, µ̂si) = {0.907− 0.096γ̂(µ̂si)}+ {1.328− 0.874γ̂(µ̂si)} s−it. (9)
The first bracketed term in equation (9) represents the intercept of the best response
29See Blume et al. (2015) for an extensive discussion of linear social interactions models.
30We note that we find values of τs that are distinguishable from one for some of our robustness
check specifications, presented in Table 10 in Appendix A.4.
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function for student i, that is how much this student would study even if her friends
did not study at all. This term consists of −θ1 =0.907, the common component of the
intercept across students, and −0.096γ̂(µ̂si), the component characterizing variation
in the intercept across students. Likewise, the second bracketed term in equation
(9) reveals the slope of the best response function, that is, reactiveness, or how a
student’s choice of study time depends on the study time of her friends. This terms
consists of (β2 − θ1) = 1.328, the common component of the slope across students,
and−0.874γ̂(µ̂si), the component characterizing variation in the slope across students.
With γ(µsi) =
1
exp(τµ,1µsi+τµ,2µ2si)
, the latter component in both the first and second
bracketed terms depends on the estimated values of τµ,1 = 0.105 and τµ,2 = −0.003,
which indicate that γ(·) is decreasing and convex in one’s study type, µs. The latter
component also depends on the value of one’s study type, µs, which is determined by
the cost function parameters ωs. As seen at the end of Table 6, study type is increasing
in high school GPA and high school study time, but is smaller for males.31 Effective
study types γ̂(µ̂s) and human capital types µ̂y are not very strongly correlated with
a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.106. This follows from the fact that high school
study time is a strong determinant of study types, but, as we show later, not of human
capital types.
To provide a better sense of the total effect of peer study effort in the best response
functions, Figure 2 plots best response functions for the lowest (lower dotted orange
line), 25th percentile (lower dashed purple line), median (dot-dashed red line), and
75th percentile (higher dashed purple line), and the highest (higher dotted orange
line) effective study types, γ̂(µ̂s). The table just below Figure 2 calculates equation
(9) for each effective study type, presenting the type-specific intercept (i.e., the first
bracketed term in equation (9)) in the top row and the coefficient on friend study time
(i.e., the second bracketed term in equation (9)) in the bottom row. The first row
shows that there is little heterogeneity in the intercepts of best response functions;
the second row shows that reactiveness to peer study time is increasing in effective
study type. It is important to note that, even for the lowest effective study type
person (lower dotted orange line, or first column of the table), the effect of peer study
time is positive. Combining the slope and intercept terms, one’s optimal study choice
31Though black students study considerably more than nonblack students, the coefficient on being
black is negative. This may be due to the fact that black students have much higher high school
study levels, which are an important determinant of study type.
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is increasing in study type. That is, the best response is always increasing in s−it and
is often very substantial.
Figure 2: Estimated study best response functions for different effective study types
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Effective study type γ̂(µ̂s): Lowest 25th pctile Median 75th pctile Highest
Intercept 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87
Coefficient on s−it 0.46 0.66 0.74 0.82 0.95
In addition to describing individual heterogeneity in best response functions, Fig-
ure 2 provides evidence about the implications of this heterogeneity. To see this,
note that the intersection of each best response function with the identity function
indicates the equilibrium study outcome in a hypothetical scenario in which a student
was friends with someone of the same effective study type. Therefore, by comparing
where the different types’ best response functions intersect the identity function (solid
black line), we can identify equilibria when each student is matched with someone of
her respective study type. When two 75th percentile effective study types are paired
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Figure 3: Fit of mean study time (left) and GPA (right)
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they would study almost 5 hours each, almost twice the amount two 25th percentile
types would study when paired together. Our estimates indicate that the game ex-
hibits a complementarity: In total, students may study more, and therefore produce
more human capital, when matched by study type. That being said, whether or not
students will take advantage of this complementarity depends on how they sort into
friendships.
Figure 3 shows that the model closely fits mean observed study time (left panel)
and GPA (right panel), both in total and by student characteristics.32 Even though
the relationship between own and friend study time is not explicitly targeted (i.e.,
friend study time does not explicitly enter the likelihood), the model also closely
captures this relationship. Figure 4 plots own versus friend study time, for both the
observed data (solid red line) and simulated outcomes (dashed blue line).33
32Model outcomes are simulated by first solving for equilibrium outcomes given Γ̂ and then ap-
plying IID measurement errors using the specification in Section 4.
33The lines in the figure are fitted values from a local quadratic regression. For each value of
friend study time the fit is computed using the closest 75% of the observations via weighted least
squares, with weights proportional to (1 − (distance/max. distance)3)3). See stat smooth in the R
package ggplot2 for details (Wickham (2009), R Core Team (2015)).
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Table 6: Parameter estimates
Parameter Estimate SE Description
Production function: y = β1 + β2sit + µyi
β1 -0.350 0.363 intercept
β2 0.254 0.057 marginal product of own study time
ωy,HS GPA 0.470 0.072 coefficient on HS GPA on human capital type
ωy,ACT 0.047 0.010 coefficient on ACT on human capital type
ωy,Black -0.213 0.089 coefficient on Black on human capital type
ωy,Male -0.037 0.073 coefficient on Male on human capital type
ωy,HS study -0.007 0.004 coefficient on HS study on human capital type
ωy,expected study -0.005 0.003 coefficient on expected study on human capital type
Study cost function: c = θ1sit + θ2γ(µsi)sit +
θ3sit
sτs−it
+ θ4γ(µsi)sit
sτs−it
+
θ5s2it
2sτs−it
θ1 -1.074 0.088 study cost terms
θ2 0.874 0.146 study cost terms
θ3 -0.907 0.524 study cost terms
θ4 0.096 0.828 study cost terms
τs 1.000 – curvature on friend study time, fixed to 1
∗
τµ,1 0.105 0.035 linear term for study type
τµ,2 -0.003 0.002 quadratic term for study type
ωs,HS GPA 1.000 – coefficient on HS GPA on study type, fixed to 1
ωs,ACT -0.063 0.054 coefficient on ACT on study type
ωs,Black -0.735 0.437 coefficient on Black on study type
ωs,Male -1.065 0.474 coefficient on Male on study type
ωs,HS study 0.344 0.096 coefficient on HS study (hours/week) on study type
ωs,expected study 0.005 0.018 coefficient on expected study (hours/week) on study type
Shocks
σ 0.721 0.017 sd measurement error for human capital
ση 2.159 0.025 sd measurement error for study time
∗ See discussion in Section 5.
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Figure 4: Fit of own study time against friend study time
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5.1 Endogeneity and Identification
Our primary endogeneity concerns arise from the potential for the relationship be-
tween a student’s study effort and that of her peers to be due, in part, to friendships
being formed on the basis of unobservable propensities to study. We attempt to mit-
igate these concerns by taking advantage of our survey collection to obtain direct
measures of students’ propensities to study. Our baseline survey elicited informa-
tion about: 1) how much a student expected to study in college and 2) how much
a student studied in high school. These measures of the propensity to study clearly
have content; they are strongly correlated with how much a student studies.34 Fur-
ther, the overall contribution of these two variables to the regression of study time
on observable characteristics and friend study time reported in Table 5 column (1)
is substantial, with their omission reducing R-squared from 0.169 to 0.087 (see Table
12 in the appendix). We stress a crucial feature of this information on study propen-
sity: it describes a student’s propensity to study at the time of entrance, immediately
before students can be influenced by their friendships at Berea. It is possible that
endogeneity concerns could arise from changes in propensity to study after entrance
and induce friendship sorting. However, if this type of endogeneity were particularly
34Bivariate regressions of each of these variables predicting own study time have slope t-statistics
of 3.104 and 7.931, for expected study and high school study, respectively.
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problematic, we would expect the strength of the relationship between a student’s
study time and friend study time to increase over time. We find no evidence that the
strength of partial correlations between own and friend study time increases across
semesters.35
One prominent concern related to sorting on unobservable propensities to study
is that the relationship between own and friend study time is caused by preferences
over course specialization. For example, if students in science courses tend to study
more and befriend students in their courses, there may be a spurious relationship
between own and friend study time. Although measures such as expected study
time would likely inform us about these preferences, we collected transcript data to
directly examine this concern. We find that a version of the descriptive regression
in Table 5, including both own and friend fraction of courses which are science, does
not appreciably change the partial correlation between own and friend study time
(0.166 vs. 0.160).36 This may be due to the fact that, not only may students make
friends with students outside classes, but the large majority of curriculum choices for
freshman are required general or introductory classes. Thus, workloads are relatively
homogeneous across all students.37
We have focused on a mechanism wherein friend study time may affect one’s own
study time, which in turn may affect one’s human capital via a production function,
equation (2). A broad set of alternative mechanisms involve peer human capital di-
rectly entering the achievement production technology. For example, friends with
high human capital may provide quick and reliable answers to questions, or may
know more about specific course requirements. Friends’ human capital is composed
of both incoming human capital and that acquired during college. Signals of these
components may be provided by pre-college characteristics and friend study time, re-
spectively. We investigate the potential importance of such mechanisms by examining
partial correlations between these signals of friend human capital and a student’s own
GPA. Table 7 presents descriptive regressions where a student’s own GPA is the out-
come and columns contain different sets of conditioning information. In all cases,
35In regressions analogous to that in Table 5 column (1), broken down by semester, estimates of
semester-specific partial correlations of friend study with own study are lower in the second semester
but statistically indistinguishable from their analogs in the first semester.
36See Table 13 in the appendix.
37On average, students take about one additional course in their area of specialization per semester
in their freshman year.
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the student’s own characteristics are included. The correlations evident in column
(1) between students’ own characteristics and their achievement are unsurprising and
motivate our use of friend characteristics as signals of their incoming human capital.
Column (2) adds friend characteristics as well as own and friend study time. Consis-
tent with the results shown in Table 5, own study time is a significant predictor of
achievement. Moving on to measures of friend human capital, there do not appear
to be strong partial correlations between students’ GPAs and signals of the incoming
human capital of their friends. This leads us to conclude that mechanisms involving
a direct role of friends’ incoming human capital are not motivated in our application.
In contrast, friend study time helps predict own achievement: though the esti-
mated coefficient on friend study time is less than half the coefficient on own study
time in column (2), it is statistically different from zero.38 This leaves open the pos-
sibility that both own and friend study time should enter the production function.
Therefore, we consider an alternative to our baseline model where friend study time
also directly enters the achievement production function. In particular, we estimate
a specification that adds a term linear in s−it to the production technology in equa-
tion (2). The estimated coefficient on friend study time is small and not significantly
different from zero. Thus, we find no evidence of a direct role for peer study time
in the achievement production function. We conjecture that the predictive power of
peer study time in Table 7 could be due to its being a signal of own study time rather
than arising from a role as an direct input in production.
5.2 Quantitative Findings
How much does it matter who your friends are? We conduct two counterfactual exer-
cises using the estimated model to address this question. First, we characterize how
students respond to changes in friend study time by exogenously increasing (shock-
ing) the study time of each student and measuring how study times and achievement
change for other students in the network. In addition to providing evidence about how
network structure (At) and student characteristics jointly determine how students are
affected by their peers, this exercise provides a natural framework for quantifying the
38The point estimate of the partial correlation between own study time and GPA is 0.090 when we
exclude friend study time from the regression in column (2). The coefficients on own and friend study
time remain essentially unchanged when we exclude measures of friend incoming human capital from
the specification in column (2).
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Table 7: Investigating alternative mechanisms
Dependent variable:
GPA
(1) (2)
Male −0.156∗∗∗ −0.115
(0.060) (0.086)
Black −0.188∗∗ −0.154
(0.083) (0.121)
HS GPA 0.493∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.069)
ACT 0.037∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
HS study 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Expected study −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Own study 0.084∗∗∗
(0.019)
Frac. male friends 0.063
(0.108)
Frac. black friends −0.117
(0.150)
Friend HS GPA 0.056
(0.108)
Friend ACT 0.006
(0.014)
Friend HS study −0.003
(0.004)
Friend expected study 0.007
(0.004)
Friend study 0.039∗∗
(0.018)
Constant 0.561∗ −0.134
(0.290) (0.501)
Observations 608 571
R2 0.228 0.271
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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importance of general equilibrium effects as well as the importance of heterogeneity in
the effect of peers. Second, because peer effects are a function of not only how students
respond to changes in peer inputs but also who is friends with whom, we examine how
achievement would differ if, instead of sorting into friendships as in Table 4, students
were randomly assigned friends. This exercise provides a natural comparison point
from which we can assess the importance of homophily in friendships.
Throughout this section, we compare outcomes between baseline and counterfac-
tual scenarios for achievement, own study time, and friend study time. We use scfit and
sbaselineit to denote student i’s study time in the counterfactual and baseline scenarios,
respectively. We define the treatment effect on achievement for student i in period t
as ∆yit ≡ y(scfit, µyi)− y(sbaselineit , µyi). Treatment effects for own and friend study time
are defined analogously.
5.2.1 Network structure, student characteristics, and the response to
peer input changes
To provide quantitative evidence about how students respond to changes in peer
study time, we estimate the impulse response to an impulse of increasing study effort.
Specifically, we increase (shock) the study time of a single student by one hour per
day in a particular semester and examine the responses of all other students in the
network in that semester. We summarize our findings when we perform this exercise
614 times, once for each of the 307 students in each of the two semesters.
The averages in the first row of Table 8 show how the effect of the study shock
varies with a student’s distance from the shocked student. For example, to obtain
the number in the second column we first compute, for each student j in each of
the two semesters t, the mean response in achievement for all students who are one
link away from j when j is shocked in semester t. Averaging this mean response
over all students and semesters shows that, on average, students who are one link
away from the shocked node have an achievement gain of 0.078. Similarly, the third,
fourth, and fifth columns, respectively, show that, on average, students who are two
links, three links, and four links away from the shocked node, respectively, have an
achievement gain of 0.022, 0.006, and 0.002, respectively. The final column involves
first computing, for each student j in each of the two semesters t, the total response in
achievement,
∑
i 6=j ∆
y
it, for all students (other than j) who are in the network when j
is shocked in semester t. Averaging this total response over all students and semesters
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shows that, on average, the total effect of the shock is 0.52.
The general equilibrium effects in the first row take into account the full set of
feedback effects in the network. In contrast, partial equilibrium effects, which are
computed by calculating only the best response (as opposed to study time choices in
the new equilibrium) for students directly connected to the shocked student, would
take into account only how the exogenous shock to a node influences students who
are directly linked to her. Thus, as illustrated by Figure 1, general equilibrium effects
will be larger than the partial equilibrium effects that are frequently computed in
the peer effects literature. To quantify the importance of this difference, the second
row of Table 8 shows the partial equilibrium effects. The average effect on students
who are one link away from the shocked node is about 1/4 smaller under partial
equilibrium than general equilibrium (0.059 vs. 0.078), while, by definition, the effect
on the (typically) large number of students who are two or more links away from the
shocked node is zero in the partial equilibrium case. The last column shows that,
on average, the total response of the shock is only 0.19 GPA points. Therefore, if
we considered only partial equilibrium effects we would, on average, understate the
achievement response by 64%. Thus, our results suggest it may be much easier to
find evidence of social interactions when general equilibrium effects are taken into
account.
Table 8: Average change in achievement (GPA points)
Avg. effect, by distance from shocked node Total
Dist. from shocked node 0 1 2 3 4 response
General equilibrium 0.254 0.078 0.022 0.006 0.002 0.52
Partial equilibrium 0.254 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19
In addition to computing the average value of the total response
∑
i 6=j ∆
y
it over
each student j who is shocked in each of the two semesters t, we can examine how
much this total varies depending on which j is shocked in t. The Box and Whisker
plot in Figure 5 shows that the total response in achievement varies substantially
depending on which student is shocked. For example, under the general equilibrium
case, the first quartile, median, and third quartile of the total increase in GPA are 0.33,
0.49, and 0.66, respectively. To get a better sense of what drives the heterogeneity
in achievement gains by which node is shocked, the left panel of Figure 6 shows the
relationship between the centrality of the shocked node and the total GPA response,
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Figure 5: Distribution of partial versus general equilibrium effects across students
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taking into account general equilibrium effects.39 As before, this calculation excludes
the mechanical gain in achievement experienced by the shocked node. Each dot
records the total GPA response (y-axis) in the economy by the percentile centrality
that semester, or by how central the shocked node is (x-axis). The size of each (blue)
dot shows the degree (i.e., number of friends) of the shocked node. Larger dots are
concentrated at the top-right, and smaller ones at the bottom-left, i.e., students with
more friends tend to have higher centrality indices. Intuitively, because the effects
of effort changes are stronger the closer students are, the total response is higher
when the shocked node is more centrally located.40 The right panel of Figure 6 plots
partial equilibrium effects (red dots). We can see here that, though shocked nodes
have the same degree (dot sizes), the average response is not as strongly increasing
in centrality of the shocked node. This is the case because the general equilibrium
effects play a larger role the more densely connected the shocked node is to the rest
of the network.
Figure 6 evinces variation in the total GPA response (i.e., the y-axis) to shocking
39We use what is called a “closeness” centrality measure given by the reciprocal of the sum of
shortest distances between that node and every other node in the graph. Average distance to others
for unconnected nodes is set to the number of nodes (Csardi and Nepusz (2006), Freeman (1979)).
40The notion that certain students may disproportionately affect other students is related to the
concept of a “key player,” studied in Ballester et al. (2006).
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Figure 6: Total GPA response, by centrality of shocked node
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different students who are similarly central (i.e., the x-axis) and who also have the
same number of friends (i.e., dot sizes). We use two examples to illustrate how
the structure of the social network interacts with the distribution of best response
functions, which depend on student characteristics, to determine how changes in
students’ actions affect other students.
The left panel of Figure 7a shows the subgraph containing students within three
degrees of the student whose shock creates the largest total GPA response. The right
panel shows the subgraph containing students within three degrees of the student
whose shock creates the smallest total GPA response.41 The total responses corre-
spond to the ends of the whiskers shown in the right panel of Figure 5. In each
case, the shocked student is denoted by a red star. Squares represent males and cir-
cles represent females. Shapes corresponding to black students are shaded and those
corresponding to nonblacks are unshaded. The area for the circle or square repre-
senting a student other than the shocked student is proportional to the slope of that
student’s best response function (similar to those presented in the second column of
the table just below Figure 2). Both subgraphs show homophilous sorting based on
the characteristics which affect best response functions – black students tend to be
friends with other black students (and nonblacks with nonblacks), males tend to be
41These responses take into account general equilibrium effects.
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friends with males (and females with females); in general, students with steeper best
response functions tend to be friends with each other.
The link structures of the subgraphs are very different. The shocked student in
the left panel has six friends while the shocked student in the right panel has only
one friend. The number of students within three degrees of the shocked student is
also much larger (39 vs. 12).42
These statistics computed purely from network structure do not tell the whole
story. In addition to the structure of links, how the heterogeneous students are
arranged on the network matters a great deal. The friends of the shocked student
in the left panel have steeper best response functions than the friend of the shocked
student in the right panel. In the right panel, the shock is immediately dampened by
being passed through the student’s only, nonresponsive friend.
Figure 7b shows the analogous plot where the area of the shape is now proportional
to the achievement gain for that student. The effect of the shock dies off in the same
pattern illustrated by the first row of Table 8, that is, shapes further from the star
tend to be smaller. Friends of the shocked student in the left subgraph gain much
more than the friend of the shocked student in the right subgraph. Due to the much
steeper best response functions of the shocked student’s friends, the impulse dies out
much less quickly in the left subgraph. Indeed, the gains for students who are two links
from the shocked student in the left subgraph are about the same magnitude as the
gain for the student directly connected to the shocked student in the right subgraph.
This persistence comes from both the steeper best response functions of direct friends
of the shocked student and the fact that many of them are also connected to each
other, further augmenting the effects of the shock through feedback. Although the
average slope of best response functions is similar between the subgraphs, 0.759 in
the left vs. 0.698 in the right, there is a big difference in the average amount gained
due to the specific manner in which students are arranged on the network (0.030
vs. 0.001 GPA points). Naturally, when combined with the much larger number of
students in the left subgraph, the total response is 1.29 GPA points, compared with
0.087 GPA points for the right subgraph. This implies the effectiveness of policies
targeting students may depend critically on how they fit into the arrangement of the
social network.
42We limit this illustration to students within three degrees based on the first row of Table 8,
which shows the total impact dies off quite quickly in distance from the shocked student.
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Figure 7: Subgraphs corresponding to students producing the largest and smallest
total GPA responses
(a) Slope of best response functions for students within three degrees of the student producing largest
total response when shocked (left) and smallest total response when shocked (right)
(b) Gain in achievement for students within three degrees of the student producing largest total response
when shocked (left) and smallest total response when shocked (right)
Note: Red star indicates shocked student, males are square (females are circles), blacks are shaded
(nonblacks are unshaded), and area of squares and circles is proportional to outcome of interest for
corresponding students (i.e., (a) slope of best response function or (b) gain in achievement from
shocking starred student)
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5.2.2 The effect of sorting into friendships
Peer effects manifest through a combination of how students respond to the input
choices of others, which was examined in Section 5.2.1, and who is friends with whom
(i.e., sorting into friendships), which may exhibit homophily. Therefore, to provide
further evidence about the importance of peers, we compare achievement under the
baseline social network with achievement under a counterfactual where friends are
homogeneously distributed across students. In this counterfactual, for semester t,
we essentially maintain the marginal distribution of friends per student observed in
the data, but replace reported links with random draws from the entire sample of
students. We then form a counterfactual symmetrized A matrix in the same manner
as it was formed for the real data in Section 2. Repeating this process 300 times
for each of the two semesters produces 300 pairs of simulated adjacency matrices.43
Appendix Table 14 presents correlations between students’ own characteristics and
the average characteristics of their friends in both the baseline and across the sim-
ulated counterfactual networks, illustrating that the range of correlations across the
simulated counterfactual matrices is quite small.
Table 9 summarizes changes in model outcomes between the baseline and counter-
factual, averaged over all 300 simulated networks. Achievement is measured in GPA
points and study times are in hours per day. The first column shows the average
change in study time, across all students and all simulated networks, that results
from moving to homogeneous (i.e., randomly assigned) friends. The first row shows
that, on average, moving to this counterfactual would reduce own study time by 0.10
hours. Intuitively, students who, in reality (i.e., under the baseline), have friends with
strong propensities to study are most harmed by the move to a homogeneous distribu-
tion because this makes them much more likely to have lower study type friends than
in the baseline. This explains why females, blacks, and students with above-median
high school GPAs, who tend to be high study types and are seen in Table 4 to often
have friends with high-study-type characteristics under the baseline, see own study
time fall by 0.20, 0.25, and 0.15 hours, respectively. Conversely, males, who have less
studious peers under the baseline, tend to study more when friends are homogenized.
43For example, in the first semester the algorithm starts with IID draws of counterfactual “friends
per student” from the empirical marginal distribution of friends per student in A1, divided by two
and rounded to the nearest integer because A1 has been union-symmetrized. The number of directed
links per student is set to the student’s “friends per student” draw. Directed links are IID draws
from the whole set of other students.
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However, importantly, the estimated complementarities, which arise due to the het-
erogeneity in best response functions combined with sorting into friendships based on
effective study type, imply that the gains of lower study types are smaller than the
losses of the higher study types. This explains the overall decrease in own study time.
Removing the sorting in the manner of our experiment does not merely re-allocate
output, but also lowers total output. Accordingly, the standard deviation of own
study time drops by 29%. A similar story drives both the overall results and the
stratified results associated with changes in friend study time in the second column
of Table 9.
The third column of Table 9 shows the average change in achievement across all
students and all simulated networks that result from the changes in study time found
in the first column. The first row shows that, on average, moving to the counterfactual
would reduce achievement by 0.02 GPA points. However, as expected given the
findings of study time, the declines are largest for black students, female students,
and students with above-median high school GPAs. As before, the losses to these
groups are not offset by the gains to other groups. Homogenizing the distribution of
friends’ characteristics would increase the baseline GPA gap between nonblack and
black students of 0.5 GPA points by 14%, reduce the baseline GPA gap between
female and male students of 0.31 GPA points by almost 20%, and reduce the baseline
GPA gap between students with above-median and below-median high school GPAs
of 0.60 GPA points by 7%. Overall, homogenizing friends would reduce the standard
deviation of achievement by 5%. Figure 8 illustrates the range of average achievement
over all of the simulations, providing the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Only the group
with below-median high school GPAs has an interval that contains zero, reinforcing
the finding that sorting significantly affects student achievement.
In an attempt to put our results in a broader context, we take advantage of our
longitudinal data to provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation about how graduation
rates might change under the counterfactual.44 Our data allow us to estimate the
mapping between first year achievement and the probability that a student graduates
44Another advantage of mapping human capital to graduation rates is that this relationship is
arguably invariant to general equilibrium effects on the relationship between human capital and
achievement that may result from large changes in achievement. For example, suppose course grades
were curved upwards in response to a policy change that reduced average human capital. In this
scenario, average GPA might not change despite their being a lower aggregate level of achievement,
while graduation rates would likely be lower if they were a function of human capital, not GPA.
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Table 9: Average changes for study time (hours), achievement (GPA points), and
predicted probability of graduation resulting from counterfactual homogeneous dis-
tribution of friend characteristics, across simulated networks
Own study time Friend study time Achievement Prob. Graduate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 -0.006
Nonblack -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.001
Black -0.25 -0.36 -0.07 -0.029
Female -0.20 -0.25 -0.05 -0.016
Male 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.008
Below-med. HS GPA -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.001
Above-med. HS GPA -0.15 -0.20 -0.04 -0.010
Figure 8: Effect of homogenizing friends on average achievement (GPA points), across
simulated networks
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from college within ten years of starting.45 Column (4) of Table 9 shows the average
change in the graduation probability over all students and all simulated networks. The
share of students graduating would fall slightly (about half a percentage point) under
the counterfactual assignment of friends. However, as expected given our previous
results, there are non-trivial differences in the effects across groups. For example,
while the share of female students graduating would decrease by 1.6 percentage points,
the share of male students graduating would increase by almost one percentage point.
While the share of black students graduating would decrease by 2.9 percentage points,
the share of nonblack students graduating would essentially remain the same. These
changes are not trivial when compared to the size of other effects in the literature.
For example, Belley and Lochner (2007) find that moving from the lowest to highest
income quartile would increase college graduation rates by 10 percentage points.46
Finally, Figure 9 illustrates how the change in achievement arising under the
counterfactual varies across students within particular observable groups, for one pair
of simulated adjacency matrices (one for each semester). The figure plots the CDF
for the change in achievement by race and sex. Over three quarters of black women
(dotted red line) and about 60% of nonblack women (solid red line) would have lower
achievement if friends were randomly assigned. The median black male (dotted blue
line) would not experience a change in achievement if friends were randomly assigned,
while most nonblack males (solid blue line) would gain. Our results show that, not
only does there exist substantial heterogeneity in the response to the counterfactual
across observable groups, there also exists heterogeneity in the response within these
observable groups.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents an equilibrium model of student study time choices and the pro-
duction of achievement. Social interactions are present because costs of study time
for a student depend on the study times of that student’s peers. We estimate this
model and provide evidence that this mechanism is important in the production of
academic achievement. Our approach was made possible by three key features of the
45Details of these calculations are in Appendix A.6.
46Intervals of the type shown in Figure 8 do not contain zero for females, males, blacks and the
full sample.
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Figure 9: Changes in achievement (GPA points), by group
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BPS: direct measurements of study time, credible measurements of a social network
for a cohort of Berea students, and unusually rich measures of ability and propensity
to study. We use the structural model to examine counterfactuals that are informa-
tive about the role of network feedback effects and sorting in peer characteristics.
Heterogeneity in student characteristics and how students are interconnected deter-
mine the distribution of responses to changes in a student’s study time. Our results
indicate that general equilibrium effects mediated by the whole social network are
quantitatively important in determining the responses of network-wide study time
and achievement to shocks in study time. In addition, our results indicate that ho-
mophily, or sorting in peers’ characteristics, plays an important role in the production
of achievement.
In this paper we investigate the importance of well-motivated and intuitively plau-
sible mechanisms underlying peer effects in our context. We do not claim nor expect
that these are the only mechanisms underlying influences across peers. Thus an ex-
amination of other mechanisms potentially underlying peer effects in higher education
is an important direction for future work. In particular, mechanisms in settings like
advanced classes could easily differ from those most relevant for the freshman year
general classes that we study in the current paper. The panel nature of the BPS
allows us the potential to investigate the importance of joint production of achieve-
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ment in advanced classes. In particular, the time-use information and administrative
records of class and major choices in the BPS data would be well-suited to such an
investigation.
A major area for future work is the development of better methodology for mea-
suring entire social networks, building upon the robustness exercises studying alter-
native definitions of friendships conducted in Appendix A.4. These exercises show
that general equilibrium contributions to outcomes were substantial across four ways
of measuring networks, but, as expected, there are some differences in the results ob-
tained using directed and undirected networks. Future work investigating the sources
of these differences could substantially improve our understanding of how to properly
specify networks and best measure them in education settings. A more complete
analysis of the role of measurement error in link reporting and how to best utilize
longitudinal data on network connections is also potentially very valuable in many
other applications of social network models (Comola and Fafchamps (2013)).
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A Data
A.1 Survey questions
Figure 10: Time diary question
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Figure 11: Friends question
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A.2 Concavity of best response function
The optimal choice of study time for the period game solves the function G(s, s−i) =
∂c
∂s
−β2 = 0. To find how s varies with friend study time, use the Implicit Function
Theorem:
∂s
∂s−i
= −
∂G
∂s−i
∂G
∂s
= −
∂2c
∂s∂s−i
∂2c
∂s2
.
If friend study time decreases the cost of increasing one’s own study time, the numer-
ator is positive. If the cost of studying is convex in own study time, the denominator
is negative, meaning the overall sign is positive. Moreover, if friend study time enters
c(· · · ) in a weakly concave manner, e.g., τs ≤ 1, the numerator is weakly smaller in
absolute value for larger values of s−i, i.e. study time is weakly concave in friend
study time.
A.3 Proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Claim 2. Let k be the number of hours during the entire time period. There exists a
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium if ψi : R
N 7→ R are weakly concave and weakly
increasing, ψi(0) > 0, and ψi(k) < k for i ∈ N .
Proof. Define S = [0, k]N , i.e. a compact and convex set. Define a function Ψ:
Ψ : S 7→ S =

ψ1(x−1)
ψ2(x−2)
...
ψN(x−N)
 .
Existence: Ψ(·) is a continuous self map on the compact set S, so an equilibrium
exists by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem.
Uniqueness: If Ψ(·) is strictly concave and weakly increasing we can apply Ken-
nan (2001). Next, consider the case where Ψ(·) is linear, in which case we can prove
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Ψ(·) is a contraction. Write the linear form of Ψ(·) as
Ψ(X) =

α11 + α21x−1
α12 + α22x−2
...
α1N + α2Nx−N
 ,
where, by assumption, maxi∈N{α2i} < 1. Let distance be calculated according to the
taxicab distance, i.e. d(X1, X2) =
∑
g∈N |X1g−X2g| for X1, X2 ∈ S. The Contraction
Mapping Theorem holds if d(Ψ(X1),Ψ(X2)) ≤ δd(X1, X2), for δ ∈ (0, 1). Calculating
this for the special case where Ψ is a linear map, we have
d(Ψ(X1),Ψ(X2)) =
∑
i∈N
α2i|X1 −X2| ≤ max
i∈N
{α2i}|X1 −X2| < d(X1, X2),
i.e. the condition for the Contraction Mapping Theorem is satisfied, where δ =
maxi∈N{α2i} ∈ (0, 1).
A.4 Robustness to specification of adjacency matrix
Recall that our baseline social network is defined using a union approach: At(i, j) = 1
if either i or j report a friendship in the last social network survey of semester t,
resulting in a symmetric adjacency matrix. We believe this to be the most reasonable
definition of friendships given the mechanism we investigate, but friendships could
be defined in other ways as well. In these robustness exercises, we consider alternate
definitions of At using directed links so At(i, j) = 1 only if i reports a friendship with j
in the last social network survey of semester t. Denote the directed adjacency matrix
in period t as A˜t. In addition, we exploit our repeated measurements of friendships
by constructing networks for the second semester that uses information in the first
semester network. We compute a “never lose friends” network for the second semester
by replacing zeros in A2 with ones if the corresponding link is present in A1; we use
this two-survey approach for both the undirected and directed networks. Table 10
contains parameter estimates for different specifications of the adjacency matrix. It
is organized by column as follows:
1. Symmetrized: This is our baseline specification, whereAt(i, j) = max{A˜t(i, j), A˜t(j, i)}
2. Asymmetric: At(i, j) = A˜t(i, j)
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3. Asymmetric, never lose friends: At(i, j) = maxt′≤t{A˜t′(i, j)}
4. Symmetrized, never lose friends: At(i, j) = maxt′≤t{max{A˜t′(i, j), A˜t′(j, i)}}
The most restrictive definition of friendship is the directed (asymmetric) one (col-
umn (2)), the most inclusive is the symmetrized version where there is no friendship
destruction (column (4)). The top part of the table presents parameter estimates.
Table 10: Parameter estimates for different specifications of the adjacency matrix A
Parameter Symmetrized A Asymmetric A Asymmetric A Symmetrized A
(baseline) (never lose a friend) (never lose a friend)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production function
β1 -0.350 -0.385 -0.685 -0.488
β2 0.254 0.140 0.269 0.320
ωy,HS GPA 0.470 0.469 0.548 0.496
ωy,ACT 0.047 0.063 0.041 0.037
ωy,Black -0.213 -0.169 -0.165 -0.223
ωy,Male -0.037 -0.034 -0.025 -0.044
ωy,HS study -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.007
ωy,expected study -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005
Study cost function
θ1 -1.074 -1.854 -1.413 -1.323
θ2 0.874 1.054 1.137 1.112
θ3 -0.907 -0.735 -1.480 -1.927
θ4 0.096 0.418 0.551 1.472
τs 1 0.683 0.955 0.992
τµ,1 0.105 0.147 0.042 0.061
τµ,2 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002
ωs,HS GPA 1 1 1 1
ωs,ACT -0.063 -0.080 -0.094 -0.061
ωs,Black -0.735 -0.194 -1.436 -0.727
ωs,Male -1.065 -1.300 -1.359 -0.476
ωs,HS study 0.344 0.301 0.562 0.315
ωs,expected study 0.005 -0.016 -0.006 0.019
Shocks
σ 0.721 0.689 0.773 0.764
ση 2.159 2.125 2.180 2.173
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Table 11 shows the impulse response function from Table 8, supplemented with
those computed for the other specifications of the adjacency matrix. The gains from
considering general equilibrium effects for students one link from the shocked node
are non-trivial, but do differ between scenarios, ranging from 18% for the asymmetric
friends scenario (2) to 33% in the scenario considering the symmetrized adjacency
matrix where there is no friend destruction (4).
Table 11: Avg. change in achievement by distance from shocked node, for different
specifications of the adjacency matrix
Distance from shocked node
(1) Baseline (Symmetrized) 0 1 2 3 4
Partial equilibrium 0.254 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000
General equilibrium 0.254 0.078 0.022 0.006 0.002
(2) Asymmetric 0 1 2 3 4
Partial equilibrium 0.140 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000
General equilibrium 0.140 0.047 0.015 0.005 0.001
(3) Asymmetric, never lose 0 1 2 3 4
Partial equilibrium 0.269 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000
General equilibrium 0.269 0.068 0.017 0.005 0.001
(4) Symmetric, never lose 0 1 2 3 4
Partial equilibrium 0.320 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000
General equilibrium 0.320 0.080 0.019 0.005 0.001
A.5 Additional tables
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Table 12: Study time regressions controlling for different sets of characteristics, pooled
over both semesters
Dependent variable:
Own study
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male −0.369∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.140) (0.135)
Black 0.116 0.333∗ 0.324∗
(0.186) (0.192) (0.172)
HS GPA 0.413∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗
(0.149) (0.156)
ACT −0.032 −0.029
(0.021) (0.022)
HS study 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006)
Expected study −0.002
(0.006)
Friends study 0.166∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Constant 1.915∗∗∗ 2.167∗∗∗ 2.850∗∗∗ 2.648∗∗∗
(0.671) (0.679) (0.172) (0.152)
Observations 574 574 574 574
R2 0.169 0.087 0.076 0.058
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 14 presents correlations between students’ own characteristics and the aver-
age characteristics of their friends. The first column shows that the correlations in our
baseline networks (i.e., in the data) are substantial. The second column shows that
the average correlation over all of the simulated counterfactual adjacency matrices is,
by construction, nearly zero. The third and fourth columns illustrate that the range
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Table 13: Study time regressions, pooled over both semesters
Dependent variable:
Own study
(1) (2)
Male −0.369∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.137)
Black 0.116 0.115
(0.186) (0.187)
HS GPA 0.413∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.150)
ACT −0.032 −0.034
(0.021) (0.021)
HS study 0.043∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Expected study −0.002 −0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Own share science courses 0.349
(0.390)
Friend study 0.166∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038)
Avg. friend share science courses 0.880
(0.562)
Constant 1.915∗∗∗ 1.873∗∗∗
(0.671) (0.684)
Observations 574 574
R2 0.169 0.176
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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of correlations across the simulated counterfactual matrices is quite small, providing
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
Table 14: Characteristics of baseline and counterfactual social networks
Baseline Avg. simulated 2.5 pctile 97.5 pctile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. number of friends 3.309 3.389 3.240 3.522
Own and avg. friends’ correlations
Black 0.736 -0.004 -0.111 0.103
Male 0.712 -0.006 -0.113 0.105
HS GPA 0.234 -0.004 -0.107 0.088
ACT 0.307 -0.003 -0.101 0.105
HS study 0.233 -0.004 -0.101 0.097
Expected study 0.139 -0.001 -0.117 0.104
A.6 Graduation rates
In an attempt to relate student human capital to graduation outcomes, Table 15
shows the results of a probit of graduating within ten years of starting college on
first year achievement. Column (1) shows the results of a probit of graduating on
the estimated human capital type µ̂y and average model achievement during the first
two semesters of college.47 Column (2) runs a similar probit, substituting student
characteristics in for estimated human capital type. Both statistical models show a
strong link between performance during the first year and whether or not a student
graduates from college within ten years of starting. The results in the fourth column
of Table 9 are calculated using the covariates in the first column; the results are very
similar when we to use those in the second column instead.
47Note that this specification is consistent with the separable manner in which human capital type
and own study time enter the human capital production function.
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Table 15: Probit of graduating on average of first year achievement
Dependent variable:
Graduate
(1) (2)
µ̂y −0.063
(0.458)
Black 0.417
(0.275)
Male −0.303
(0.205)
HS GPA 0.309
(0.391)
ACT −0.051
(0.041)
HS study −0.013
(0.008)
Expected study 0.003
(0.009)
Avg. achievement♥ 1.249∗∗∗ 1.309∗
(0.444) (0.672)
Constant −2.772∗∗∗ −2.799∗∗∗
(0.578) (0.900)
Observations 307 307
Log Likelihood −154.725 −146.111
Akaike Inf. Crit. 315.451 308.221
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
♥: Average of model achievement across both semesters
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We use the estimated coefficients and model achievement given a social network to
predict the probability of graduation for each student in that social network. Then,
for each of our 300 simulated pairs of networks, we can compare the predicted prob-
ability of graduation for each student under the baseline network to the predicted
probability of graduation after achievement has changed under the simulated coun-
terfactual network. Averaging the difference in predicted probabilities (between the
baseline and counterfactual) across all students produces the change in predicted
graduation rates for the simulated network pair.
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